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We critically discuss recent developments in the theory of banking, focus-
ing on the two set of services that banks jointly provide: payment services by
means of bookkeeping transactions and ﬁnancial intermediation services. The
limitation of the available information, of the capabilities of the human mind,
and of the available time of any individual, produce relevant departures from
the basic assumptions of perfectly competitive markets, creating the need for
institutions such as banks. It can be shown that market forces can be very
eﬀective in assuring contractual performance in the banking industry, reduc-
ing the need of generalised legal restrictions. Besides, taking into account
the peculiarities of contemporary banking institutions, credit rationing seems
to be a far less signiﬁcant phenomenon. The main conclusion of the analy-
sis is that the focus of many current regulations of the banking system, in
continental Europe in particular, is misplaced. The current regulatory frame-
work produces too many distortions in market prices and the allocation of
resources, and regulations impose a heavy burden on taxpayers. On the con-
trary, the more fundamental causes of instability are not properly addressed
by the current legal requirements.
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1Introduction
Banks provide jointly two fundamental sets of services. They provide payment
services by means of bookkeeping transactions and they provide ﬁnancial interme-
diation services. Most of the studies on the banking industry have focused on the
second set of services, while the relevance of the ﬁrst has often been neglected,1
notwithstanding the fact that the provision of payment services was crucial in the
historical development of banking institutions. In this paper we will critically dis-
cuss recent developments in the theory of banking, mainly due to the analysis of
the importance of limited information and uncertainty and of the transaction costs
and market imperfections that limited information and uncertainty cause. We focus
on the two set of services that banks provide, showing how the limitation of the
available information, of the capabilities of the human mind, and of the available
time of any individual, produce relevant departures from the basic assumptions of
perfectly competitive markets, creating the need for institutions such as banks. The
fundamental role that synergies and economies of scope between the two sect of
services play, helps to understand the historical development of credit markets.
The limited, asymmetric and costly availability of information is considered a
market imperfection that makes extensive regulations a necessity and justiﬁes the
intervention of central banks or other authorities in the market. Due to the the
asymmetry of information, equilibria where credit is rationed are often considered
a general outcome of market interactions in the industry. When this phenomenon
is considered to be quite general, a complete redeﬁnition of the role and power of
monetary policy is regarded as necessary. But most of the recent literature on the
microeconomics of the banking industry has shown that many speciﬁc features of
banking intermediation allow banks to overcome some of the problems posed by the
limited availability of information. Even more importantly, it can be shown that
market forces can be very eﬀective in assuring contractual performance in the bank-
ing industry, reducing the need of generalised legal restrictions. Implicit contracts
that shape many of the institutional features we observe can be very eﬀective market
solutions. Banks themselves have a speciﬁc role to play just because of the imperfect
diﬀusion of information. In a world with costless availability of information banks
would not exits. As a consequence the role of many of the speciﬁc aspect of the
banking intermediation, such as the fragile structure of banking liabilities, can be
understood only considering these problems. Taking into account the peculiarities of
contemporary banking institutions, credit rationing seems to be a far less signiﬁcant
phenomenon.
The main conclusion of the analysis is that the focus of many current regulations
of the banking system, in continental Europe in particular, is misplaced. The cur-
rent regulatory framework produces too many distortions in market prices and the
allocation of resources, and regulations impose a heavy burden on taxpayers. On the
contrary, the more fundamental causes of instability, which require the design of a
proper regulatory framework, are not properly addressed by the legal requirements.
1The most relevant exception is Eugene A. Fama, who worked his theory of banks on the basis
of this fundamental bipartition.
2Transaction services and ﬁnancial intermediation
Banks provide jointly two diﬀerent sets of services. They provide transaction services
allowing their customers to transfer goods by means of simple bookkeeping entries.
And they act as intermediaries between risk-averse agents that need to allocate
their savings and risk neutral ﬁrms that invest on their behalf.2These two sets of
services involve diﬀerent skills and technology, and can be provided separately by
diﬀerent types of institutions. Central banks provide payment services to other
agents without providing services of ﬁnancial intermediation. Most mutual funds
provide just ﬁnancial intermediation, while pension funds and life insurers provide
jointly ﬁnancial intermediation services with insurance services. In the case of banks
though, the two services are normally provided jointly, because banks can exploit
relevant economies of scope. The joint provision of these two types of services has
been so successful that banks that provided both services have emerged in the most
diﬀerent countries.3 Even many contemporary central banks initially were universal
banks that used to provide both services.4 As a consequence, in order too understand
the problems and the historical development of the banking industry it is necessary to
analyse separately the two functions. At the same time it is important to understand
the origin of the economies of scope between the two services, since historical trends
of the industry show that these economies are certainly overwhelming and are a
fundamental aspect of the banking industry as it stands.5
These two sets of services imply diﬀerent industrial costs and provide diﬀerent
revenues, and in abstract the two services provided can easily be separated, deﬁning
two diﬀerent problems. In empirical analysis though it is much harder, because
revenues of one service are often confused with revenues or costs of the other and
vice-versa. Banks in fact do not always charge their customers with the entire cost
of their transactions by means of fees. They often prefer to implicitly charge part
those costs as a reduction of the rate paid on deposits or an increase in the rate
charged on loans. On the contrary, when the payment of interest rates on deposits
was forbidden, banks used to pay interests implicitly, reducing the fees charged.6
The crucial importance of a separate study of the two functions has been recog-
nised by Fama. He showed that in the provision of payment services the banking
industry is not substantially diﬀerent from any other industry, and it has to be
analysed by means of standard general equilibrium analysis.7 This implies that an
2See Fama [23].
3See for example Born [9].
4See Goodhart [29].
5A recent example is provided by the development of Money Market Mutual Funds. Traditional
intermediaries such as mutual funds that did not provide monetary services began to provide them
in competition with banks. These funds have actually become banks, even if of a peculiar kind,
because they do not provide direct lending facilities that are illiquid.
6See Klein [42] and Barro and Santomero [3].
7In a second paper he showed that monetary problems of price level determination could be
disentangled from the analysis of the banking industry. If banks were not required to hold reserves
in currency, both functions that banks fulﬁl would not interfere with price level determination,
that would just depend on the amount of currency issued. In this regard commercial banks would
become similar to Money Market Mutual Funds. Even if they can provide monetary services and
create liquidity, no one would think that they inﬂuence the price level determination.
3industrial cost function with standard properties can be deﬁned for the provision
of these services. Unfortunately not much attention has been devoted in the litera-
ture to this aspect of the industry, notwithstanding the fact that most banks earn
a relevant share of their proﬁts from fees. Even more important, historically the
ﬁrst banks emerged to provide transaction services without the need of the physical
transfer of gold or other precious metals. The transfer was in fact both expensive
and dangerous. So the ﬁrst banks were market solutions to problems caused by
transaction costs and uncertainty. Storing gold in safe vaults and making payments
by means of letters of credit or bank notes was an eﬃcient way to reduce the cost
and risk of the transactions. Letters of credit were based on personal knowledge
and the reputation of the intermediary, bank notes just on the reputation of the
issuer, since the holders of the notes could in no way monitor the reserves. This
intermediation was possible because bankers could acquire information and develop
a reputation at a lower cost than any other agent. As a consequence, a general
equilibrium formalisation of this industrial problem must assume as a starting point
the absence of perfect information.
The ﬁnancial intermediation services have been deeply studied, since most of the
literature has focused on this aspect of the banking industry. In a world with costless
information banks would exist only because other agents face participation costs in
the ﬁnancial markets. They could make a better use of their time than studying
the innumerable securities that could allow them a perfect smoothing of consump-
tion.8 Intermediaries would be useful in order to tailor portfolios of securities on the
diﬀerent needs of diﬀerent agents, portfolios that could largely be packed in a stan-
dardised fashion, with obvious cost savings.9In this environment banks would not
face any decreasing returns in the management of their asset portfolio. Loans would
be perfect substitutes for bonds, and banks could securitize loans in any moment,
just incurring in some transaction costs. The composition of the portfolio would
just depend on the diﬀerent transaction and industrial costs, and in equilibrium the
diﬀerence in the return of the two assets would reﬂect those costs. Banks would
in this regard not be diﬀerent from mutual funds, the risk of their portfolio would
depend on the market risk that a perfect diversiﬁcation could always achieve, and
any increase in the size of the portfolio would just imply a linear transaction or
industrial cost. In this world the Modigliani-Miller theorem would apply to banking
ﬁrms and the composition of their liabilities would have no relevance.10 Financial
intermediaries could obtain a degree of diversiﬁcation that their liability-holders
could not achieve and would invest as agents of both shareholders and depositors.
If the costs of servicing deposits were not convex, as it seems reasonable to assume,
banks would accept any amount of deposits, paying to depositors the return of the
portfolio minus the transaction cost and the marginal proportional cost of deposits
and to shareholders the return of the portfolio minus the transaction cost.11 Under
the assumption of perfect competition, deposits interest rates would be set endoge-
8We are assuming that it is costless to acquire information, but not to process it, because it
requires time.
9See Allen and Santomero [2].
10See Fama [23].
11As in Santomero and Siegel [60] and [61].
4nously in the market for deposits and they would vary in order to establish the zero
proﬁt condition in the banking market. Because of the constant returns to scale the
supply of deposit services on part of banks would be perfectly elastic.12 Abandoning
the assumption of the costless availability of information, a peculiar role for banking
intermediation emerges.
Relationship lending, a market solution for information costs
Since the acquisition of information is costly, and the future is uncertain, loans and
bonds are two completely diﬀerent assets. The crucial diﬀerence is that bonds are
liquid, while loans are not. Bonds can be priced by the market on the basis of the
publicly available information, in particular the information disclosed by means of
the balance sheet of the issuer. Loans on the contrary are issued to ﬁrms whose
business is informatively intense and the available information is scarce and opaque.
When the disclosure of information is too expensive markets cannot properly price
the risk and a lemon problem emerge, so that the market for debt cannot exist.13
Fama [22] showed that the a major function of the banking industry in the
economic system is the analysis of information regarding the quality of the en-
trepreneurial projects that borrowers undertake. Fama’s argument is based on the
fact that certiﬁcates of deposits must pay a return competitive with the return on
bonds, but are subject to reserve requirement, that under the institutional arrange-
ments of the US represent a tax. Banks can ﬁnance their loans issuing CDs only if
the cost of the tax is actually born by borrowers. The issuance of a loan must imply
the furniture of a service that for some reason is worth more than the interest rate
paid on a bond of comparable maturity, because ﬁrms actually pay a higher interest
rate on loans than on bonds. Some ﬁrms, small ﬁrms in particular, do not have
access to ﬁnancial markets, so that bonds are not an alternative source of ﬁnance
for them and in this case the rate on bonds does not impose a ceiling on banks.
But even large ﬁrms that have a wide access to ﬁnancial markets are indebted by
means of both commercial paper and loans. “There must be something special about
bank loans that make some borrowers willing to pay higher interest rates than those
of the other securities of equivalent risk. Moreover, there must be something spe-
cial about banks that prevents other intermediaries, like insurance companies and
ﬁnance companies, whose liabilities are not subject to reserve requirements, from
competing with banks to assure that it never pays to ﬁnance loans with CDs.”14
Bank loans can not be perfect substitutes for bonds.
Issuing loans banks undertake part of the risk of the investment, and their own
entrepreneurial function is the analysis and selection of risks. Loans are diﬀerent
from bonds because banks get access to information regarding the entrepreneurial
projects of the borrower that is not available to the market. Bearing the costs
that the establishment of a personal direct relationship with the investor implies,
banks can extend short-term credit and monitor continuously the borrowers. They
can ﬁnance projects that would be unproﬁtable for other investors. Relationship
12This assumption is central in the works of Santomero and Siegel [60] and [61].
13See Ackerlof [1].
14Fama [22], p. 30.
5lending allows banks to co-ﬁnance with debt projects that would otherwise be en-
tirely ﬁnanced with equity. The competitive advantage over any other investor is
due to the long term character of the relationship that banks entertain with their
customers that provides them with information regarding the quality of the invest-
ments and the reliability of the borrowers. By means of a consolidated personal
relationship, they can obtain particular knowledge regarding almost every aspect of
the entrepreneurial activity of the borrowers. This “inside lending” gives banks a
comparative advantage with respect to any other form of ”outside” debt. As “in-
side” lenders they can evaluate the investment projects, and even more importantly,
the borrower. The success of most entrepreneurial projects is in fact based on some
peculiar knowledge of market conditions. Peculiar information regarding the condi-
tions of a particular market, in a particular place, in a particular moment.15 The
knowledge of these particular circumstances of place and time, together with the
command of skills which are often based on tacit knowledge,16 forms most of the in-
tangible capital of the borrower, be him and individual or a ﬁrm. The true problem
of the banker is to evaluate the intangible capital, that cannot be collateralised and
often is the main asset of the borrower.17 Whenever the intangible capital is large
with respect to the tangible assets of the borrower, relationship lending is the only
available source of ﬁnance beside equity. Large ﬁrms, or even better diversiﬁed cor-
porations, whose business is well established and whose risks are well known, under
normal conditions do not need the relationship to the extent that small ﬁrms do.18
These ﬁrms can provide large collateral, whose value is easy to ascertain and can
get ﬁnance trough ﬁnancial markets as well as credit facilities from diﬀerent banks.
The empirical study of the relevance of relationship lending has accordingly been
based mainly on small ﬁrms’ bank credit. Berger and Udell [4], Petersen and Rajan
[53], and Cole [12], among others, have provided a strong evidence supporting the
theory.19 The speciﬁc skills that the relationship lender acquires in the evaluation
15See Hayek [34].
16Information and skills that are embedded in the particular traditions, rules of conduct and
capacity of single individuals, and are not transferable because they are strictly subjective.
17“Not all the knowledge of the ever changing particular facts that man continually uses lends
itself to organization or systematic exposition; much of it exists only dispersed among countless
individuals. The same applies to that important part of expert knowledge which is not substantive
knowledge but merely knowledge of where and how to ﬁnd the needed information.” Hayek [35] p.
25.
18This is not true when they are distressed.
19Petersen and Rajan [53] showed that the availability of ﬁnancing increases for ﬁrms that have
close ties with an institutional creditor. According to their results, “relationships are valuable and
appear to operate more trough quantities rather then prices”. (Petersen and Rajan [53], p. 3).
Their work is based on the analysis of a data set of small ﬁrms in the USA. Berger and Udell
[5] showed that “borrowers with longer relationships pay lower interest rates and are less likely to
pledge more collateral”. (Berger and Udell [5], p. 351). They use data for small business, and
the main diﬀerence with respect with the former work is their focus on loans issued under lines of
credit, a restricted set of loans, the one most likely to be aﬀected by the nature of the relationship.
The study by Cole [12] has analysed “the importance of relationship to the availability of credit”,
conﬁrming its importance for credit relations. The hypothesis of the work is that a bank cannot
easily and quickly increase the number of its borrowers because it has to evaluate their solvency.
If it wishes to rapidly expand its activities it has to rely on already existent relationships, and this
represents a severe constraint on the possibility of expanding the number of loans granted. This
6of intangible capital and the analysis of “inside” information cannot be obtained by
other intermediaries such as insurance companies and prevents them from compet-
ing in the issuance of loans. Fama’s argument though has another implication. It
must be explained why borrowers that could get access to cheaper ﬁnance in the
bond market are willing to pay banks a premium in order to obtain loans.
Small ﬁrms are normally considered to need banks because they could not get
ﬁnanced otherwise, but this statement is not correct. Small ﬁrms need banks to
manage their payments, while they have two relevant alternative sources of funds,
represented by self ﬁnancing trough the liquidity generated and the issuance of
equity. Self ﬁnancing has always been a very important source of ﬁnance, and
even in a country where banks have played a key role, such as Germany, it has
recently been shown that self-ﬁnancing was the main source of ﬁnance during the
nineteenth century. The issuance of equity is normally ﬁnanced by the individual
owners with their own patrimony, and it becomes very important when the ﬁrm
is hit by a liquidity shock. The development of venture capital and private equity
investments has increased the relevance of equity ﬁnance even for small ﬁrms that
have a limited access to ﬁnancial markets. The only source of ﬁnance that is normally
precluded to small ﬁrms is the bond market. The reason is that the cost of the
disclosure of the relevant information, necessary for the market to price the risk,
is normally overwhelming the beneﬁts of the issuance of bonds. The disclosure of
the relevant information in fact normally requires the presence of an intermediary
whose reputation guarantees the reliability of the information itself.20 Firms willing
to access the bond market need to get ﬁnanced from banks for a relevant period of
time, because the issuance of loans is an important signal for the market. When
the intermediary places the bond, it must be willing to keep a relevant stake of
the placement, providing another important signal to the market. Both Fama and
Diamond suggested that large ﬁrms need to rely on bank loans in order to be able to
place their bonds. For this reason, even if they do not need to pay the higher interest
rates charged on loans, because they have access to cheaper sources of ﬁnance in
the bond market, large ﬁrms borrow from banks to signal their credibility to the
market. This explanation though is not entirely convincing for those ﬁrms which
already have a good established reputation, a good credit rating and whose capital
is largely composed of tangible assets. These ﬁrms must have another reason to
borrow from banks. The most reasonable explanation is that the relationship is
worth the cost because it provides a safety net in case large adverse shocks make
it diﬃcult the access to ﬁnancial markets. Shocks of diﬀerent origin may in fact
jeopardize the information available to the market. In this case the market cannot
properly price the risk, a lemon problem emerges and the market dries up. There are
diﬀerent examples of the kind of shocks that cause these problems. A typical case is a
negative demand shock, such as the one that aﬀected suppliers of telecommunications
companies in the late 2001. Another example were the scandals that have put in
question the reliability of the accounting ﬁgures provided by many diﬀerent ﬁrms.
Other shocks may aﬀect the market as a whole, as it happened after the collapse of
the LTCM, following which no bond could be placed for more than a month. In any
leads the bank to have diﬀerent kind of contractual agreements with diﬀerent classes of customers.
20As shown by Diamond [18].
7of these case often companies may ﬁnd themselves in the impossibility of getting
ﬁnance, in the moment they need it most, because their liquidity is strained. Bank
loans provide insurance against shocks, allowing the ﬁrm to get immediately the
necessary liquidity. For this reason even when they do not borrow relevant sums
from banks, large ﬁrms are always willing to pay fees to obtain lines of credit that
they often do not use. The fees and the higher rate that they eventually pay is the
insurance premium.
The fundamental problem that aﬀects the borrower-lender relationship is that
the asymmetry in the knowledge of the factors that aﬀects the possible outcomes
of the investment project causes typically both moral-hazard and adverse-selection
problems. Diﬀerent assumptions regarding the particular form of asymmetric infor-
mation have been proposed, to study diﬀerent aspects of the banking ﬁrm. Asym-
metries of information cannot be used to explain all aspects of the intermediation
of banking institutions without incurring the risk of choosing ad hoc assumptions
to justify ex post the institutions we observe. But the relevance of the asymmetries
highlights a fundamental institutional problem: any contractual agreements that
rational agents establish must be incentive-compatible. Since lenders by deﬁnition
know less about the investment projects undertaken by the borrowers than the bor-
rowers themselves, their contractual agreements must be rational given that each
part knows the incentives of the other. The fundamental contribution of Gale and
Hellwig [28] was to show that the standard debt contract is incentive compatible.
They showed that with costly state veriﬁcation an eﬃcient mechanism that guaran-
tees the correct disclosure of the information is given by a contract which allows the
creditor to obtain all the returns of the project when the borrower declares that he
cannot fulﬁl his obligations. It can be shown that the optimal contractual agreement
is a debt contract, where the rate charged is obtained given the market interest rate
and the quantity of funds demanded imposing to the borrower the whole cost of
veriﬁcation. When the veriﬁcation is too costly the debt contract remains optimal
if the borrower must incur in case of default in a cost that it cannot transfer. If
this bankruptcy cost is large enough the borrower has always the incentive to re-
port the correct outcome to the lender, and so the contract is incentive-compatible.
A typical example of the cost of bankruptcy is the value of the reputation: if the
borrower values his reputation (which allows him to borrow in the future) more
than the beneﬁts from opportunistic default, he will always report the correct out-
come. Asymmetric information produces another important outcome, it generates
monopoly power. Sharpe [66] showed that “customer relationships arise between
banks and ﬁrms because, in the process of lending, a bank learns more than others
about it own customers. This information asymmetry allows lenders to capture some
of the rents generated by their older customers”.21 Relationship lending allows the
bank to price monopolistically and the higher return due to the market power makes
the higher risks of the project worth. According to this theory ﬁrms are trapped in
the relationship because it is too costly to convey the relevant information to other
banks. Sharpe suggests as well that competition among banks to capture the rents
could generate an ineﬃcient allocation of capital, since competing banks would oﬀer
better terms to all customers, because they cannot select them, in order to get a
21Sharpe [66], abstract.
8share of the rents. The ineﬃciency is due to the incapability of the bank to per-
fectly price discriminate. This problem though can be solved by means of implicit
contracts, non binding commitments backed by reputation. Under the agreement of
these implicit contracts, banks would not exploit their market power in order to keep
the borrowers of good quality. The questionable assumption of the model is that
competing banks would use price competition to attract new customers at the cost of
mispricing the risk. Sharpe’s argument in fact implicitly depends on the assumption
that banks are risk neutral, so that they do not require a proportional return for the
risk involved in ﬁnancing the low quality projects. But as we will discuss further,
even risk neutral banks would require a premium to ﬁnance investments with opaque
information. The opacity of information produces radical uncertainty, that is not a
risk that the market can price. Establishing the relationship and developing their
knowledge, banks provide a valuable service, they create the knowledge necessary to
price the risk. The price that ﬁrms pay for this service is the monopolistic rent that
they pay on loans. Empirically, Cosimano and Mc Donald [15], analysing a large
panel of bank loans, have shown that banks in the US exploit signiﬁcant market
power in the market for loans. This results strongly support our conclusions.
Delegation of monitoring activities and the banking ﬁrm
The lender we have been describing up to now does not necessarily reﬂect any of
the peculiar features that banking institutions have acquired in most countries. We
were alternatively used the terms bank and banker, because we were focusing on
the entrepreneurial aspects of the lending activity. Considering a world in which
information is not perfectly available and uncertainty and transaction costs play an
important role, we must focus on institutions. It is necessary to explain the role of
banking ﬁrms, showing what makes these institutions diﬀerent from contracts avail-
able in the market.22 When the relevant information is not available in a costless
way a whole set of problems emerges that make institutions necessary. Whenever
the bank is not just an individual ﬁrm, the main problem of banking ﬁrms is how
to create an organisation that allows the desk oﬃcer with the necessary freedom
to evaluate projects and borrowers, keeping under control the agency problems.23
The root of the problem lies in the fact that since not all possible outcomes of a
deal can be forecasted, two parties cannot stipulate contracts that cover all possible
contingencies. Because of the incompleteness of contracts, other non-contractual
mechanisms have to be developed.24 The peculiar aspects that make banking ﬁrms
diﬀerent from other institutions can be understood trying to explain if and how
interactions among rational agents can produce institutions similar to the ones we
normally observe. This exercise is necessary to distinguish features that are con-
stituent parts of the institution from features that are an un-necessary outcome of
the particular regulation put in place.
In ﬁrst order it necessary to ask why the analysis of the inside information that
banks undertake cannot be dealt with by the ﬁnal providers of ﬁnance, savers in
22As it was shown by Coase.
23See Berger and Udell [5].
24See Rajan [55].
9general. The main reason is that the information is costly to acquire. In most
cases the cost would be so heavy that it could not be sustainable by most individual
agents willing to lend part of their endowments. It follows that a group of diﬀerent
lenders has a strong incentive to delegate the function of monitoring to a speciﬁc
intermediary, in order to avoid duplication. But delegation raises the problem of the
control of the intermediary on part of the lenders, depositors in particular. Since
the intermediary normally is a ﬁrm with limited liability, the problem is to control
the risk taking activity of the bank. Diamond [17] has shown, that diversiﬁcation
among diﬀerent investment projects plays a crucial role. The larger scale of activity
of a delegated intermediary allows a much wider diversiﬁcation than any individual
lender could achieve. In the case when there are no limits to the extension of
the portfolio of the bank and returns from the projects undertaken by borrowers
are independent, diversiﬁcation can reduce the risk to zero, solving any problem
regarding the control of the intermediary on part of risk adverse lenders. Niinim¨ aki
[52] has recently showed that the same crucial role can be played by intertemporal
diversiﬁcation, when the two main assumptions of Diamond’s model are relaxed.
The mismatch of maturities, that produces the intertemporal diversiﬁcation, allows
lenders to monitor the behaviour of the intermediary in a very eﬃcient way.
Another characteristic feature of banking institutions is the peculiar structure of
their liabilities. Diamond and Rajan have proved that the fragile ﬁnancial structure
of banks has got an economic rationale. Demand deposits, which are subject to
bank runs, allow banks to overcome the problems due to the illiquidity of an assets
portfolio composed mainly of loans.25The relationship lender has in fact got speciﬁc
skills and knowledge that allow her to select and monitor investment projects. As a
consequence, she can obtain a higher return from the resources she lends than any
unskilled agent could do. When she acts as an intermediary agent of the holders
of the liability, once the terms of the contract are stipulated and she has invested
the sum received issuing loans, she always faces an incentive to threaten not use her
skills unless the terms of the original agreement are renegotiated in her favour. Her
creditors would in this case have no better option than accepting the new terms,
and the relationship lender could reduce the payment down to the amount that the
unskilled lender could obtain liquidating the loans. “Because the best user of the
asset cannot commit to employing his specialized human capital on behalf of others,
the asset is illiquid.”26 For this reason it would be very diﬃcult for banks to ﬁnance
their lending activities, because no one would be willing to lend to banks. In order
to solve this problem banks can issue demand deposits, redeemable at demand. The
threat to refuse his collection skills, would in this case cause a bank run, forcing the
bank to liquidate immediately all the assets and loosing any rents. The threat of a
bank run guarantees that banks (and their shareholders) pass trough to depositors
the premium that the entrepreneur pays. “So the fragility of her capital structure
enables the relationship lender to borrow against the full value of the illiquid loan she
holds. This then enables her to lend up front without demanding an expected return
premium for illiquidity, and without liquidating the entrepreneur when faced with a
25See Diamond and Rajan [19]
26Diamond and Rajan [20], p. 423.
10liquidity shock. Financial fragility allows liquidity creation.”27 In other words “the
fragility of capital structure enables the relationship lender to issue demand deposits
worth the full value of the illiquid loan portfolio she holds. This than enables her to
lend upfront as if the loan itself were liquid”.28
The intermediation of the banker is necessary because the entrepreneur, whose
assets are illiquid too, could not issue deposits himself. The important diﬀerence
between the entrepreneur and the banker is that the ﬁrst creates value, while the
second’s capability is just to recover more of the value created by the entrepreneur
if he defaults. The bank run is an eﬀective threat for the banker, because losing the
ownership of the loan her rents are reduced to zero, so she is has everything to loose
form the run. On the contrary the entrepreneur, using his own skills produces value.
This implies that a mechanism such as a bank run would not be eﬀective in reducing
his incentive to renegotiate. Subtracting the ownership of the investment project in
order to liquidate the asset, the depositors would loose most of the value. A bank run
would allow just a small percentage of the depositors to recover a small percentage
of the money lent. So this kind of threat could hardly be a strong enough guarantee
for creditors. Besides the entrepreneur could even keep some of the return of the
investment even after the liquidation of the tangible assets that he has eventually
provided as collateral. The higher this return the higher would his incentive be.
The fundamental constraint that might prevent the borrower from renegotiating
is the need to renew the agreement with the bank in the future. If the entrepreneur
repeatedly needs ﬁnance he has an incentive not to renege his initial commitment.
This is true if he faces enough uncertainty regarding his future liquidity needs.29
The position of the bank can strongly be reinforced if all bankers agree explicitly
or implicitly not to extend credit to someone that has previously defaulted. Not
surprisingly this is a common feature of all banking systems. Because of this mutual
agreement, banks can in fact credibly adopt an implicit tit for tat strategy, that
is eﬃcient as long as the gains from a single default do not exceed the expected
gains form the continuation of the relationship. And not surprisingly most bank
loans and lines of credit are usually short term, and need a frequent renegotiation.
Quite surprisingly, on the contrary, relationship lending is sustainable only when the
borrower is subject to some radical uncertainty regarding his future liquidity needs.
The future uncertainty is eﬀective in deterring opportunistic behaviour because the
assets of the borrower are not liquid. As highlighted by Myers and Rajan [49], in
fact, greater assets liquidity reduces the ﬁrm’s capability to commit to a speciﬁc
course of action. Finally, the moral hazard problem can be reduced if the capability
of the bank to obtain and process the relevant knowledge regarding the investment
grows as the relationship takes place and goes on. In this case the bank could get a
higher share of the return in case of default, either by directly running the business,
or transferring the ownership of the investment to another entrepreneur. As we will
discuss in more detail, an important device that banks normally adopt in order to
follow this strategy is to compel borrowers to hold deposits in the bank itself, so
that the bank can manage the payments of the ﬁrm, obtaining relevant information.
27Diamond and Rajan [19] p. 3.
28Diamond and Rajan [20], p. 424.
29Formally this implies that he is uncertain regarding the number of repetitions of the game.
11A very important conclusion that we can draw from this literature is that in
the banking industry the role of market forces in assuring contractual performance
is very relevant, much more than in other industries. Klein and Leﬄer, in their
fundamental contribution on the topic,30 have shown that implicit contracts may
be a powerful device to insure contractual performance. They showed that implicit
contracts backed by reputation can be very eﬃcient as long as the value of the
reputation, measured by the discounted ﬂow of future gains from the continuation
of the relationship is larger than the beneﬁt from breaking the contract. In the case
of ﬁrms supplying products of diﬀerent quality, they showed that higher prices can
be a very eﬀective device since increasing the value of the reputation they signal
the willingness to stick to the agreement. In the case of the trade relationship
between banks and customers can be very eﬃcient for both parts. On the one hand
it can easily be shown that if the borrower expects relevant beneﬁts from future
relationships, debt contracts may be incentive compatible even when the cost of
veriﬁcation of the uncertain cash ﬂows of the borrower is so high to make the actual
veriﬁcation on part of the lender impossible. If the borrower gives a relevant value
to the gains from future debt contracts, she will always be willing to declare the
correct outcome. This is important because it shows that debt contracts may be
subscribed and respected even when the legal system is not based on the Rule of Law,
or when the enforcement of the law is poor. This explains why unreliable borrowers
such as the feudal kings and lords, or many contemporary democratic governments,
could obtain credit from the private sector.31 On the other hand the market power
with respect to both depositors and borrowers which beneﬁts banks, gives banks a
strong incentive not to renege their commitments whenever they stipulate long-term
contracts.
Bonds, loans and imperfect information
In order to understand the role and the function of banks in the economic system
it is necessary to explain why ﬁnancial market and banks complement each other.
In order to do so it is necessary to explain what makes the portfolio of assets of a
bank diﬀerent from a market portfolio that any agent can purchase in a world where
the cost of the acquisition of information is not irrelevant. Even in this case it is
reasonable to assume that banks can manage a portfolio of bonds without incurring
in increasing marginal costs. If the costs of servicing deposits are not convex, banks
would still accept any amount of deposits, paying to depositors and shareholders
the net return of the portfolio. Non linear costs are in fact quite implausible as long
as we assume banks to be price takers in the market for bonds, which is normally
sound. On the contrary with imperfect information it is necessary to assume that
the issuance of loans implies the existence of convex default costs. The reason is
that increasing indeﬁnitely the quantity of loans issued, sooner or later a bank will
end up ﬁnancing projects with a lower than average return. The assumption is that
the information gathering technology presents decreasing returns. If banks cannot
30Klein and Leﬄer [43].
31And conversely why a too large extension of credit provides an almost irresistible temptation
to default.
12perfectly discriminate among customers, and consequently cannot perfectly price
discriminate, their default costs increase more than proportionally as the quantity
of loans is increased.32 Another way by which the same phenomenon can be seen,
is that increasing the amount of loans the analysis of the value of the collateral
becomes increasingly diﬃcult and complex. This argument might seem at odds
with standard ﬁnancial theory, such as the CAPM, that suggests that there is a
market price for risk, and any agent can buy any amount of risk at the market price.
But it is not. Banks in fact can buy in risks in ﬁnancial markets as any other agent
buying bonds, and obviously we assume that they do not face any decreasing return
in this activity. But a competitive market for risk exists just for investment projects
on which enough information has already been disclosed. Loans are issued to ﬁnance
projects whose risk cannot be eﬃciently priced. And Diamond has shown that it’s
mainly by means of banks that ﬁrms get access to ﬁnancial markets, because banks
can disclose the relevant information to the market in a more credible way. Issuing
loans, banks provide the market with signal regarding the credit worthiness of a
particular borrower.33
There is an apparently obvious argument for the opposite conclusion that lending
on a larger scale implies lower default costs: the consideration that a higher level of
loans should imply a higher diversiﬁcation. But beneﬁts from diversiﬁcation cannot
be a linear, or even less a convex function, of the amount of loans. The reason
is that diversiﬁcation is limited by the existent production structure of the market
where the bank is structured. And there is an even more substantial problem.
Banks do not have perfect ex-ante information on the risk of the projects that they
ﬁnance.34 Their entrepreneurial function is to discover and properly price the risk
of diﬀerent projects.35 So they can’t make use of any peculiar knowledge on the
correlation of diﬀerent risks, because they cannot forecast ex-ante the correlation of
the shocks among diﬀerent projects. The banks like the market cannot price the
risk, simply because there is no risk to be priced, the uncertainty of the investment
projects entertained by the borrowers is in fact not measurable.36 When banks obtain
the necessary information and have enough knowledge to do a reliable evaluation
of the correlation of the risk of a ﬁrm (or of a single industrial project with the
32Alternatively it ca be assumed that banks have a constant return to scale technology in the
monitoring activity, and that returns are a convex stochastic function of the level of monitoring.
This is the road followed by Gorton and Pennacchi [30].
33See Diamond [18].
34“Much of the particular information which any individual possesses can be used only to the
extent to which he himself can use it in his own decisions. Nobody can communicate to another
all that he knows, because much of the information he can make use of he himself will elicit only
in the process of making plans for action. Such information will be evoked as he works upon the
particular task he has undertaken in the conditions he ﬁnds himself, such as the relative scarcity
of various materials to which he has access. Only thus can the individual ﬁnd out what to look
for, and what helps him to do this in the market is the responses others make to what they ﬁnd in
their own environments. The overall problem is not merely to make use of given knowledge, but
to discover as much information as is worth searching for in prevailing conditions”. Hayek [36], p.
77.
35These arguments are in line with the arguments exposed by Scholtens and Van Wensween [62]
on the role of ﬁnancial intermediaries, and are of course in the spirit of the Austrian school.
36See Knight [45].
13other risks of the market), they are not necessary any more. In this case banks
become willing to promote the issuance of bonds on part of the ﬁrm, gaining a
commission on the transaction, or otherwise to securitize the loan. The impressive
development of the loan sales market has allowed banks to focus on their primary
role, the disclosure of the information reducing the uncertainty of the ﬁnance activity.
The secondary market for loans allows banks to sell their assets as soon as they
become marketable. But there is another aspect of the problem. Since banks can sell
in any moment any part of their loans portfolio, it has become increasingly diﬃcult
for the market to price the portfolio of banks. As a consequence it has become
even more risky than before for long-term investors to ﬁnance banks. They prefer
to buy the individual risks in the market for commercial paper.37 As a consequence
banks must rely mainly on deposits for their ﬁnance or they must incur in the
expensive investment of building a reputation for having a high-quality portfolio of
loans. Gorton and Pennacchi [30] have studied empirically loans sales by banks in
the US. They showed that “the model’s prediction that a bank will retain a greater
portion of more risky loans, that is, those with a higher equilibrium loan sale yield,
was strongly supported by our empirical test.” Besides, “the empirical evidence as
a whole suggests that certain types of loans may not be perfectly liquid. A loan
selling bank must continue to convince loan buyers of its commitment to evaluate
the credit of borrowers by maintaining a portion of the loan’s risk”.38 When dealing
with high-quality borrowers, on the other hand, it is diﬃcult to keep the monopolistic
rents due to the exclusive information. These rents cannot be kept for long when
the investment projects ﬁnanced are successful and the information on the risk is
spread. The root of the problem is that information becomes in a short time a
non-rival public good, which the bank cannot use in monopolistic condition for long
periods of time, since it is impossible to stop the ﬁrm from disclosing the relevant
information to the competitors. As Rajan has convincingly argued in fact, “there is
a fundamental trade-oﬀ between bank debt and arm’s-length debt. The bank can
monitor the ﬁrm and control its investment decisions. However, in the very process
of doing this, it alters the division of the surplus between itself and the ﬁrm. This
distorts the ﬁrm’s incentives. The ﬁrm may than prefer credit from arm’s-length
sources, which provide neither the beneﬁts of bank debt nor the costs”.39
Imperfect information and the deposit contract
The microeconomic literature on the banking industry did not stress for a long
time the diﬀerence between deposits and other sources of funds. In a world with
perfect information there would not be any. Abandoning the assumption of costless
information, the relevance of the Modigliani-Miller theorem has been put in question,
and many recent works show that banks can only substitute deposits with other
liabilities to a limited extent. Flannery [25] showed the existence of relevant search
costs in the market for deposits and was the ﬁrst to study deposits as a quasi ﬁxed
input for the bank. He showed that in two diﬀerent time periods banks in the US
37See Rajan [55] and Myers and Rajan [49].
38Gorton and Pennacchi [30], p. 409-410.
39Rajan [54], p. 1392.
14have paid a higher rate on demand deposits than on CDs. Since operating costs
of deposit balances are notably larger for retail accounts than for negotiable CDs,
this kind of behaviour of the banking sector was apparently irrational. Flannery
showed that it can be explained as the eﬀect of the relevance of search costs in the
market for deposits. Since banks cannot easily increase the level of deposits without
incurring in search costs, nor are depositors willing to change bank easily as interest
rate vary, the rate on deposits is sticky and banks consider deposits as a quasi-ﬁxed
input. On the contrary CDs are very good substitutes of bonds and other ﬁnancial
instruments, and their market is very competitive, so the rate adjusts as quickly
as the rate on bonds. As a consequence a sharp decline of the rate on bonds is
not matched by a proportional decline of the rates on deposits, and if the shock is
strong enough the rate on CDs can become lower. Diﬀerent empirical works that
have estimated the price elasticity of deposits have conﬁrmed this explanation.
Many diﬀerent studies, conducted in diﬀerent periods and with diﬀerent econo-
metric methodologies, have proved that deposits rates are sticky. Neumark and
Sharpe [51] besides showed that not only rates are sticky, but ”on average bank are
quicker to adjust their deposit rates downward, when above the ”equilibrium” than
they are to adjust upward when below the equilibrium. Deposit interest rates of
banks in more concentrated markets are found to exhibit stronger asymmetries in
their dynamics.” Accordingly they ascribed both stickiness and asymmetries to mar-
ket power of the banks. Hannan and Berger [31] found similar results and suggested
some plausible explanation for the ﬁnding of asymmetric behaviour. In particular
they showed how their ﬁndings were inconsistent with an explanation based on costs
arising from the reaction of customers, as sometimes is assumed as the eﬀect of a
kinked demand curve due to the search costs. Anyway, they showed that it could be
the result of price conjectures arising because of the existence of a kinked demand
curve. Because of the relevance of transaction costs (mainly search costs) and of
the importance of the relation with the bank, depositors do not react when interest
rates are increased, and react only when they are reduced under a certain thresh-
old level. This behaviour determines either a kinked curve if transaction costs are
the same for diﬀerent customers, or a curve of decreasing elasticity if transaction
costs are diﬀerent. Assuming this kind of demand, banks might derive conjecture of
greater prices for interest rates increases than decrease, as in the case of a poorly
competitive market. We can conclude that interest rates on deposits are sticky and
vary asymmetrically downwards and upwards, reﬂecting both imperfect competition
and transaction costs.
The same kind of behaviour has been analyzed by Hess, considering the problem
from the point of view of the depositor. Hess [37] is a study of the relevance of
transaction costs in ﬁnancial markets. This work is based on an econometric com-
parison of wholesale and retail ﬁnancial transactions, and reached the conclusion
that transaction costs in retail markets are statistically signiﬁcant and economically
relevant.40 The conclusions of the econometric estimations conducted by Hess can
be summarized as follows: in both the wholesale and the retail market there is
40Moreover, and quite surprisingly, ”the estimated cost of not trading increased from the 1970s
to the 1980s because lower wholesale transaction costs increased the wholesale amount of trading
much more than they increased the retail amount of trading.” Hess [37], pp. 408.
15low substitutability between short-term and long-term assets and among long-term
assets. The main diﬀerence between the two cases is that own interest rates are
signiﬁcant in the determination of the portfolio only for the wholesale market.
Hess [38] applied portfolio theory to evaluate empirically the behaviour of de-
positors, in order to understand the observed fact that notwithstanding a strong
reduction in the rate of CDs at the beginning of the 90s depositors did not ad-
just their portfolios. This behaviour could be explained by either transaction costs
considerations or by a low substitutability among deposits assets. The empirical
estimation showed that transaction costs are again signiﬁcant and relevant, to the
point the estimated demand schedule in a portfolio model without transaction costs
is almost horizontal, while adopting a portfolio model with transaction costs it be-
comes almost vertical. But the main conclusion of the paper is that CDs with long
maturities are very poor substitutes for demand deposits and CDs of short maturi-
ties. When interest rates fall banks adjust the rates of the ﬁrst kind of instruments,
because they are compelled to do so, since long term CDs are good substitutes for
other market assets. Depositors do not change their portfolio choice of instruments,
because of the low substitutability among demand deposits, short term CDs and long
term CDs. Moosa [50] came to similar conclusions, showing that empirically M1 and
time deposits display signiﬁcantly diﬀerent elasticities of responses with respect to
the same variables. He concluded that they do not provide a homogeneous set of
services nor satisfy the same set of motives. According to his study, the demand for
M1 is largely explained by a capital-theoretic medium of exchange rationale while
time deposits holdings are explained by a portfolio balance rationale.
To summarize, the picture that emerges from these studies is of a credit mar-
ket segmented from other ﬁnancial markets, but in a particular way: long term
certiﬁcates issued by banks are good substitutes for other bonds, and banks have
to adjust their rates to compete with the market rates. On the contrary, demand
deposit and short run certiﬁcates, that are close substitutes, represent a segmented
market whose demand is very inelastic. The empirical ﬁndings that support the
hypothesis of the relevance of both search costs and market power in the market
for deposits is not surprising. The literature on the cost of information has in fact
shown that in presence of search costs monopolistic competition becomes the normal
market structure. Search costs allow the ﬁrm to charge non-competitive prices.41
Economies of scope in banking: banks as liquidity providers
Flannery [25] was the ﬁrst work to show that a long term relationship was a necessary
feature of the relationship between banks and depositors as well as lenders. High
search costs are in fact associated with the establishment of a deposit relationship,
giving a relevant value to the maintenance of the relationship for both depositors
and the bank, since these costs are normally shared. The joint supply of both de-
posit and lending services to long term customers might provide scope economies,
because the deposit relationship provides information that can be used in the pro-
vision of lending services.42 Accordingly, banks can provide ﬁnancial services to the
41See Salop [57] and Salop and Stiglitz [58] and [59].
42Vale [73]
16economic system, at a much lower cost than any other intermediary.43 The source
of the complementarities and of the economies of scope between the provision of de-
posit services and loans can be understood returning to the two separate functions
that banks provide: the provision of payment services and ﬁnancial intermediation.
Banks have always provided jointly the two sets of services because there were rel-
evant economies of scope that could be exploited between the two services. Since
the true entrepreneurial problem in the provision of both lies in the discovery and
management of the relevant information, in many cases one could not be provided
without the other.44
Kashyap, Rajan and Stein [41] showed that the economies of scope can be ex-
plained considering the two services of deposit and lending as “two manifestations of
the same primitive function: the provision of liquidity on demand”.45 They showed
that the bank performs the same kind of activity both issuing loans and accept-
ing deposits. The basic activity of bankers consists of screening their customers
providing payment services. This investment in information that the bank under-
takes establishing the relationships with the customers allows depositors to allocate
their savings optimally, getting a premium without giving up the liquidity. On the
other hand it provides entrepreneurs with the liquidity they need to conduct their
transactions.
Up to now we have considered exclusively the demand of ﬁnancial intermediation
services on part of ﬁrms and individual entrepreneurs. But ﬁrms, and entrepreneurs
in general, need to rely on banks for the provision of payment services to a much
larger extent than households. Bookkeeping transactions managed by banks are
virtually the only available means of payment in business transactions, so that we do
not normally realise the importance of the role that banks play in this regard. In the
absence of banks complex transactions involving cash payments would be extremely
expensive. Diﬀerent types of activities that require quick transfers would be virtually
impossible. The importance of the transaction services which the banking system
provides lies with the guarantee that banks furnish, avoiding an enormous amount of
otherwise necessary information acquisition. Banks implicitly provide everyone that
receives a payment with a screening and certiﬁcation service regarding the reliability
of the issuer.
Managing the payments and other ﬁnancial transactions of the borrower, banks
can monitor the activity of their customers in a very eﬃcient way. The management
of the payments allows a constant monitoring of the liquidity of the ﬁrm, providing
banks with most of the fundamental information they need regarding the business.
The cash-ﬂow of the ﬁrm conveys information regarding the health of the ﬁrm in real
time, and its volatility measures the impact of shocks that aﬀect the business. In
order to fully exploit the synergies between the two functions, banks lend exclusively
to ﬁrms that agree to settle all or most of their transactions by means of the bank
43The empirical analysis of Rogers [56] showed the existence of relevant complementarities among
loans, deposits and other ﬁnancial services.
44As we have already noticed, since in current banking practice revenues and costs of the two
services are normally confused, it is very hard to proof empirically the relevance of the economies
of scope.
45Kashyap, Rajan and Stein [41],Abstract.
17itself. To achieve this aim they simply compel borrowers to hold a fraction of the
loan or credit facility issued in the form of deposits.46In order to get access to the
transaction services, ﬁrms must deposit their liquidity with the bank. They use
the bank to deposit their liquidity because it is in the mutual interest of both the
bank and the ﬁrm itself. The bank can increase in this way its liabilities and extend
accordingly its revenues (this represents the implicit payment that Sprenkle [67] was
considering as the reason for the ﬁrm to hold the apparently irrational amount of
deposits that they normally hold). Firms can manage their payments in the most
eﬃcient way.
A fundamental issue is whether the creation of liquidity on part of banking ﬁrms
is subject to any binding constraint. Potentially a monopolistic bank in a closed
economy could provide the system with the amount of liquidity it desires, because
the entire amount of loans issued would feedback in its own deposits with certainty,
ﬁnancing the loans that the bank has already conceded. In a competitive system
the mechanism could remain formally unchanged, but we cannot assume that the
banking system can provide liquidity without any constraint,47 without running
the risk of falling into a “fallacy of composition”.48 Banks in fact have to face their
budget constraints that compel them to lend exclusively resources they have already
obtained. It becomes important to realise how individual banks create liquidity for
the system, since decisions regarding loans are taken at the individual level, while the
feedback on deposits is the eﬀect of the loans of all banks of the system. Brunner
[10] has provided a fundamental explanation showing how the multiplier linking
the amount of loans issued to the amount of deposits of the system emerges in a
competitive banking system. Under a system of regulation that requires reserve
coeﬃcients, banks lend on the basis of their available free reserves. He has shown
that the multiplier operates determining the amount of free reserves and showed the
factors that aﬀect the value of the multiplier for individual banks. The magnitude of
the multiplier connecting deposits to loans depends on both institutional factors and
market conditions, and it is peculiar of every bank. The main factors are probably
market concentration (the feedback is higher as the market is less competitive), the
velocity of circulation of money (the higher the velocity, the lower the feedback) and
the degree of openness of the region in which the bank operates (the more closed
the economy of the region is, the higher the feedback).
In a (monopolistically) competitive banking system banks are constrained in
every period by their liabilities, and by the availability of free reserves. But since
assets feedback in liabilities because of the liquidity creation, the problem is bounded
as long as the feedback coeﬃcient is smaller than one, generating a multiplier that
does not diverge. As it was initially realised by Tobin, the constraint on the size
of the bank must be caused by the presence of some convex costs. Our previous
discussion showed that convex costs in the banking industry are the costs of default.
46As shown by Sprenkle [67] and [68].
47As post Keynesians or the theory of monetary circuit often do, see Lavoie [46] for a recent
discussion of the issue.
48Keynes observed that is incorrect to infer conclusion regarding the behaviour of aggregates
from theoretical considerations exclusively derived at the micro level, but the same can be true the
other way round.
18In this framework default costs act as the true constraint on the creation of liquidity.
A constraint which can be overcome if banks are allowed to roll over indeﬁnitely
the debt to insolvent borrowers. If the default of the borrower could be indeﬁnitely
postponed, the maximisation problem of the banking ﬁrm would become unbounded,
and the process of liquidity creation could in principle become explosive. The most
serious problem that regulatory agencies have to face is that banks always have a
strong incentive to roll over loans rather than causing a default. Since defaults are
the only constraint that banks face, because creating liquidity they can directly or
indirectly overcome any resource limitation, the enforcement of rules that compel
banks to write oﬀ non-performing loans as soon as they emerge becomes of crucial
importance.
Market forces may not be eﬃcient enough to guarantee the stability of the bank-
ing system when large negative shocks hit the borrowers. When the value of non-
performing loans becomes larger than the value of capital, the interest of managers
and shareholders of banks is to roll the loans over, colluding with the borrowers
at the expense of the debt-holders of the bank. In this case the value of equity
becomes zero and shareholders have nothing to loose from the postponement of the
bankruptcy, since all the new risk falls on debt. Implicit or explicit contractual
guarantees are not suﬃcient to protect bond-holders in this case and the threat of
bank run may not be suﬃcient. It is the information asymmetry between equity
and debt-holders that provides a strong incentive to equity-holders or their agents
to collude with borrowers. Since when the negative shock hits the portfolio of the
bank the ﬁrst obtain the information in advance, they can collude to prevent the di-
vulgation of the information. In absence of external rules that impose the write-oﬀ,
the debt contract with a banking intermediary is not incentive-compatible anymore
in the case of extreme shocks.
Portfolio composition
The theories of banking intermediation reviewed so far have focused on the direct
lending activities of banks. The study of the problems concerning the limited avail-
ability of information has brought these theories to emphasize the role of deposits. 49
They have showed how ﬁnancial intermediaries specialised in the issuance of loans,
ﬁnanced by fragile liabilities such as deposits, can spontaneously emerge and suc-
cessfully operate in ﬁnancial markets. Banking intermediation by means of demand
deposits allows the ﬁnancing of uncertain investment projects on part of risk-averse
agents. And demand deposits can be substituted by other liabilities to a limited
extent only. As Flannery [26] has shown, credit intermediaries can not easily obtain
long-term credit. Following Merton, he showed that a leveraged bank has a very
strong incentive to increase the risk of its assets, because shareholders beneﬁt at the
expense of bondholders. Debt is in fact a concave function, while equity is a convex
function of the value of the underlying investment. Equity holders always face a
strong incentive to increase the risk proﬁle of the investment once a bond has been
issued, because the extra risk would be faced by bond-holders. In an eﬃcient market
49In stark contrast to older models of banking, that did not stress the peculiarity of deposits,
such as the classic model by Klein [44].
19rational bondholders would proportionally increase the cost of ﬁnance for the bank.
As a consequence the cost of debt ﬁnance is much higher for a bank than for any
other ﬁrm, because banks are risk dealers and there it is no contractual agreement
that can establish ex-ante the risk taken. Since this problem worsens with the dura-
tion of the bond, banks are pushed towards short term sources of ﬁnance, deposits
in particular. The possibility of being redeemed on demand makes deposits immune
from this problem. Banks can obtain long-term credit issuing bonds to a limited
extent only, and these funds cannot substitute deposits.
The peculiar fragile structure of banks’ liabilities, centred on deposits is necessary
for the ﬁnancing of opaque investment projects. But the same fragile ﬁnancial
structure could be used to purchase other assets, and would always be useful to
reduce agency problems due to the superior information of the intermediary.50 In
other words, deposits are necessary for loans, but loans are not necessary for deposits.
Banks could issue deposits and use the funds to buy bonds or any other asset. So if
banks are constrained in the choice of their liabilities they must not necessarily be
so in the choice of their assets. The optimal composition of the portfolio of assets
of the bank remains an open problem. Traditional portfolio theories, such as Hart
and Jaﬀe [32], have tried to adapt Markovitz portfolio approach to the problem
of an intermediary. The model has been applied to banks assuming banks to be
risk adverse agents that maximize a concave utility function where proﬁts are the
argument. Assuming all returns to be exogenous, the optimal portfolio of assets
and liabilities is jointly determined. The main ﬂaw of the model is that under the
assumption that interest rates on assets are higher than on liabilities, the bank might
be willing to expand its portfolio indeﬁnitely. The relevance of this problem can be
reduced introducing an endogenous process of interest rates determination, assuming
that banks compete monopolistically and estimate the demand for deposits and
loans, as proposed by Szeg¨ o [71]. Yet these models have not been further developed
because they are at odds with the standard assumption of risk neutrality in the
theory of the ﬁrm. For most problems, besides, the assumption of risk aversion
is not necessary, and portfolio models can be developed even in its absence. In a
fundamental paper, Lindley and Sealey [65] have shown that studying the industrial
problem of the banking ﬁrm, deposits have to be considered as an input, and in order
to maximise proﬁts banks have to equate separately the marginal revenues and costs
of any asset. As in the case of a multi-product industrial ﬁrm, there is not a corner
solution, so that the bank does not choose to allocate all the portfolio in just one
asset, as long as management costs are diﬀerent. Since the industrial costs of assets
such as bonds or loans are completely diﬀerent, the maximisation problem of the
banking ﬁrm is a portfolio problem. Returns oﬀered by securities such as bonds,
equities, shares of hedge funds or complex derivatives represent the opportunity cost
of loans. Under the regulatory framework existent in most countries, banks are in
fact now to a large extent free to choose the composition of their assets portfolio
from a wide range of alternatives. The progressive deregulation of ﬁnancial and
credit markets has strongly increased these possibilities, and the universal bank has
become the dominant model for banking ﬁrms. The analysis of the factors that
aﬀect the composition of the portfolio of banks has become increasingly important,
50In the absence of which the intermediation would be useless.
20since banks do not need to rely exclusively on direct lending anymore. And because
of the imperfection of information, banking intermediation is not neutral. If banks
decide to reduce the issuance of loans, innovative investment has to be ﬁnanced more
intensely with equity, but if equity markets are bearish, it could be diﬃcult.
The peculiarity of the composition of the liabilities of the bank has got another
important implication. The bank may not be free to choose the size of its liabilities,
and, accordingly the size of its assets portfolio. This problem is linked to the double
function that demand deposit play, because agents demand deposits not just as an
asset in the optimal allocation of their savings on one side they, but they mainly
demand deposits for the transaction services they provide. This implies that a
large part of the demand for deposits depends on factors entirely exogenous to the
market, such as income variations. As a consequence higher interest rates might
increase the demand for deposits to a limited extent only. This means that banks
must consider the amount of deposits as largely exogenous in the short run, a quasi-
ﬁxed input. Deposits may be split in two categories: core deposits, whose amount
is largely insensitive to interest rates and depends essentially on the demand for
transaction, and other deposits (mainly time deposits) whose demand varies with
interest rates. This distinction is particularly relevant because the theories discussed
so far imply that banks can substitute deposits with other liabilities to a limited
extent only. Empirically this prediction has been strongly supported. Jayaratne
and Morgan have shown that “loan growth at banks is positively, strongly correlated
with their deposits growth, even after controlling for lending opportunities ...The
lending deposits correlation is most pronounced at poorly capitalized banks, where
the theory suggests the informational frictions should be the more severe.”
Credit rationing and interest rate smoothing
The importance of the composition of the portfolio has been neglected in recent
years, but it lies at the roots of any explanation of equilibrium credit rationing.
This theory assumes that ﬁrms are rationed because banks choose not to allocate
their assets to direct lending in the amounts that would be necessary to fulﬁl the
demand at the given rates.51 Interest rates on loans do not rise eliminating the de-
mand in excess because banks cannot properly screen the risk of diﬀerent borrowers,
which end up being pooled together. Consequently an increase of the interest rate
does not produce higher revenues because it would cause higher default costs. The
theories of equilibrium credit rationing though are in contrast with the theories of
relationship lending and delegated monitoring we have reviewed so far. The last
in fact show that there are strong market incentives for banks to specialise in the
discovery and analysis of information regarding investment projects. The informa-
tion gathering activity in fact gives banks market power, producing rents that last
as long the uncertainty of the outcome of the investment remains too high for the
market to price the risk. In other words there are strong market incentives not to
pool borrowers. The banking industry can be eﬃcient not because it can be compet-
itive, but on the contrary because in many situations banks can price discriminate
almost perfectly. Banks have strong incentives to invest in information, just because
51See Jaﬀee and Russell [40] or Stiglitz and Weiss [69] and [70].
21these investments allow them to price discriminate. If the information costs are
large enough, since the investment on information are normally largely invariant to
output and nonsalvageable, the bank may often be in a natural monopoly. And the
bank can not only price the loan monopolistically, but it can price-discriminate to
the extent that is able to obtain the same information of the borrower. Borrowers
accept the monopolistic and discriminatory pricing policy because it allows them to
obtain credit even when the costs of direct veriﬁcation would be so high to otherwise
prevent the stipulation of an incentive-compatible contract. Since the quantity of
funds demanded depends on the value of the investment project and the equity of
the borrower, the borrower can be willing to leave the entire surplus generated by
the loan to the lender. The borrower beneﬁts from the share of the investment that
belongs to the equity, which he would not be able to obtain without the loan.
The importance of the pooling problem depends on the relevance of the costs of
developing specialized knowledge regarding the intangible capital of the borrower.52
The pooling of borrowers occurs when the cost of the relevant information is too
high to allow the bank to discriminate among borrowers of certain classes. This
may often be the case when the number of potential borrowers is large, the average
amount of every loan demanded is small, and the risk proﬁle of potential borrowers
is similar ex ante. Under these extreme conditions only the bank accepts to pool
the borrowers, in particular if the number of potential borrowers is large, so that
the problems due to the pooling can be reduced by means of statistical analysis.
Even in this case though, we can’t conclude that ﬁrms are necessarily credit
rationed. We should rather conclude that banks’ portfolios are in these conditions
eschewed in favour of bonds or risk-free asses, reducing the ﬁnancing of innovation.
Small ﬁrms that do not have access to ﬁnancial markets can in this case be rationed,
but not necessarily. This is an implication of the fact that banks do not freely
choose the amount of deposits, and accordingly the size of the portfolio. In the
absence of constraints on the liability side, the spread between the net return on
loans and the net return on other securities would establish the amount of loans
issued. But since banks need deposits, and cannot freely choose their level, the
problem must take into account what happens on the liability side.53 Banks in fact
always have to service core deposits if they want to stay in business, and in the
amount demanded by the public. And the amount of core deposit services that
the bank provides must not necessarily be suﬃcient to ﬁnance the desired portfolio.
When their quantity is suﬃcient, since banks have to invest these amounts and price
loans monopolistically, they will always satisfy the demand for loans and invest in
other securities only the residual amounts. Banks in fact issue loans as long as the
marginal return equates the return of a portfolio of market securities. Clearly in
this case ﬁrms are normally not rationed, and do not need any other liability, a
part from capital, even if the pooling problem can cause an ineﬃcient allocation of
52On theoretical grounds Chan and Kanatas [11] showed that collateral can be used as a device
to solve the informational problems due to adverse selection and moral hazard. Stiglitz and Weiss
[70] showed that the use of collateral cannot avoid all the problems of asymmetric information that
might produce equilibrium credit rationing.
53Assuming that the liquidity creation is constrained by the proper deﬁnition of rules that compel
banks to write-oﬀ non performing loans.
22credit among diﬀerent investment projects. For rationing to emerge in this case,
the information problems have to be so severe that banks choose at the margin to
allocate funds raised as deposits to riskless securities. This situation does certainly
not occur in normal circumstances.
The other possibility is that the bank itself is rationed, because the amount of
core deposits is not enough to satisfy the demand for loans. In this case the increase
in the size of the portfolio must be matched by an expensive increase in the amount
of liabilities. The increase of the liabilities must not necessarily come from a higher
level of deposits. The marginal cost of deposits has to be compared with the marginal
cost of other liabilities, and this holds for any diﬀerent asset, since those costs are
not the same, because of the economies of scope in the analysis of information.54
In this case rationing may occur, if banks do not have enough information on their
depositors and cannot price discriminate.55 In this case increasing the amount of
deposits implies the payment of interest rates on all outstanding deposits, and this
implies a non linear increase in costs and a discontinuity in the supply curve of
loans. This happens only if the marginal cost of other sources of funds is very high,
otherwise the extra ﬁnance can be raised issuing CDs or bonds. In this case the
supply curve of loans has kink. To summarise, credit rationing may occur only if
the bank is rationed by the availability of core deposits and the gap between marginal
cost of deposits (interest rates plus marginal industrial cost) and marginal costs of
other sources of ﬁnance (market interest rates) is wide.
The empirical relevance of equilibrium credit rationing has been seriously put in
question, since the empirical evidence provided by the supporters of the theory was
not univocal. The empirical tests in support of credit rationing have mainly been
tests of the degree of stickiness of loan interest rates. Many diﬀerent econometric
estimations have shown that the commercial loan rate is slow to adjust to open
market rate changes. But the evidence regarding credit rationing has remained
quite controversial. Interest rate stickiness is in fact just a necessary condition for
the existence of credit rationing, not a suﬃcient condition. The stickiness of the rate
on loans proves just that the market for loans is not perfectly competitive. The cause
of the ineﬃcient pricing can be the existence of equilibrium credit rationing, but it
can be market power of banks, or it can reﬂect the relevance of transaction costs
that cause the demand curve of individual ﬁrms to be kinked. The work by Berger
and Udell [4] represented a big step ahead, since it was the ﬁrst to use a large panel
data to address the problem using microeconomic data. The work conﬁrmed previous
ﬁndings on the stickiness of commercial loan rates, but caste serious doubt regarding
the relevance of equilibrium rationing. It emerged in fact that loans issued under
commitment, (that are free from rationing by deﬁnition) do not behave diﬀerently
from normal loans. In particular it appeared that “the proportion of new loans
issued under commitment does not increase signiﬁcantly when credit conditions are
tight.”56 They concluded that the stickiness of the loan rate is not the eﬀect of
equilibrium rationing, but is most likely the eﬀect of intertemporal interest rates
54As underlined by Lindley and Sealey.
55Time deposits can be considered a device to segment the market for deposits in two classes, in
order to price discriminate.
56Berger and Udell [4], abstract.
23smoothing on part of the banks, a suggested by Fried and Howitt [27].
The market power produced by the investment in information allows banks to
price monopolistically, giving them the chance to negotiate implicit contracts with
their customers. Fried and Howitt showed that banks can have an interest in smooth-
ing interest rates charged to ﬁrms because of the long term character of the relation-
ship with their customers. Banks in fact can ﬁnd proﬁtable to establish an implicit
contract involving a risk sharing agreement with their borrowers, sharing the risks
associated with an uncertain future. “If loans were negotiated in spot auction mar-
kets customers would then be exposed to the risk of ﬂuctuating interest rates on
loans. A bank may be willing to insure the customer against part of such risk by
a policy of keeping interest rates less variable than they would be in spot auction
markets, in return for which the customers may be willing to compensate the bank
in the form of a higher average interest rate.”57 One of the main conclusions of their
model is that a greater variance in the sources of ﬁnance for the bank produces a
lower loan rate and that the level of rationing increases with an increase in expected
costs of funds for the bank. Berlin and Mester [6] and [7],58 provided further evi-
dence in favour of the hypothesis of intertemporal smoothing trough the exploitation
of long term relationships. These works are important as well because they were the
ﬁrst to test empirically how bank’s lending is aﬀected by shocks. According to their
results “in general loan rate smoothing in response to a credit risk shock is not part
of an optimal long-term contract between a bank and its borrower, while loan rate
s m o o t h i n gi nr e s p o n s et oa ninterest-rate shock is”.59 Only for the smallest subset
of banks a signiﬁcant positive relation could be found for a credit risk shock. After
testing for the alternative hypothesis that the relation could be driven by ineﬃcient
pricing, which they rejected, they concluded that interest rates smoothing is part of
an eﬃcient contract between banks and borrowers for all classes of banks, only in
the case of interest rate shocks. The second work is based on the same dataset as the
previous one, and considers the relationship between smoothing and core deposits,
which are deﬁned as deposits whose interest rates are particularly inelastic. They
found that “banks more heavily funded with core deposits provide borrowers with
smoother loan rates in response to changes in aggregate credit risk.” 60 The reason
is that core deposits insulate the bank’s cost of funds from shocks, so that banks
that rely mainly on core deposits can provide more loan rates smoothing in response
to shocks.61
57Fried and Howitt [27], p. 472.
58The ﬁrst of the two works was based on a panel of data consisting of information regarding
the terms of each loan of a set of US banks. This permitted the authors to estimate the degree of
smoothing and to run a regression of smoothing on proﬁts. They considered a positive relation to
be a proof of the optimality of a risk sharing implicit contract.
59Berlin and Mester [6], p. 873. Author’s italic.
60Berlin and Mester [7] p. 580.
61These ﬁndings are probably not at odds with the ﬁndings of the former work, as it is widely
recognised that small banks are the ones that rely more heavily on core deposits as a source of
ﬁnance. A higher dependence on deposits is normally peculiar to small banks, and this work seems
to justify the widely held opinion that small local banks are in general more willing to smooth
shocks.
24Conclusion: the stability of the banking system
The importance of uncertainty and limited information in the banking industry
has produced the particular characters that banking institutions have assumed in
centuries of evolution. The liquidity of deposits is not an anomaly; it is not just
the result of historical accident, but it is rather the peculiar aspect of banking
institutions. This is conﬁrmed by the observation that similar institutions have
emerged in diﬀerent countries and in diﬀerent periods of time. Banks are banks
because they ﬁnance the entrepreneurial activity creating liquidity.62
The current regulatory framework does not correctly take into account the rele-
vance of implicit contracts and the importance of market incentives for the banking
system. The original objective of the regulation was the protection of depositors in
order to insure the stability of the ﬁnancial system to prevent contagion. But the
regulation has become more extensive, and in order to avoid the disruption of the
human capital invested in the relationships that would occur with the bankruptcy of
banks, regulators do not normally allow banks in general, and large banks in partic-
ular, to go bust anymore. In most countries regulators are normally free to choose
the preferred option for the rescue of troubled institutions and are granted extensive
powers that produce heavy distortions of market prices. These distortions could
be avoided by the design of a proper regulatory framework for the bankruptcies of
ﬁnancial institutions, based on principles similar to those of Chapter Eleven of the
US. If bankruptcy procedures aim to keep the institution in function as long as rev-
enues cover variable costs, human capital is preserved whenever its preservation is
economically viable. The introduction of a framework of this kind would avoid the
moral hazard implicit with every scheme which is ultimately backed by tax-payers,
and all the distortions that derive. The standard deposit insurance scheme should
always be enough to avoid the contagion generated by the panic the follows the
disclosure of shocking new information.
On the other hand debtors, and ultimately taxpayers, are not protected enough
by current regulation from the occurrence of extreme shocks. In this regard capital
requirements cannot per se be the solution, since too stringent capital requirements
would produce an irrational allocation of capital and penalise banks with respect
to other ﬁnancial institutions. In order to protect debtors of banks and to prevent
the stability of the system much more stringent regulations are necessary for book-
keeping entries; besides these regulations must be continuously revised to follow the
evolution of ﬁnancial markets. In particular non-performing loans must always be
written-oﬀ as soon as the information is available, and special provisions must be
imposed for the risks implicit in the trading of derivatives, which can be a highly
risky business and whose information is always extremely opaque. The imposi-
tion of rules is necessary in this case because market forces alone cannot produce
incentive-compatible contracts that covers extreme outcomes, and the incomplete-
ness of contracts may in these events case be dangerous for the stability of the
system. Shareholders and managers of banking institutions face in fact a strong
incentive to collude with borrowers at the expense of bondholders and tax-payers,
whenever large defaults occur.
62As was originally illustrated by Schumpeter. See Schumpeter [63] and [64].
25References
[1] ACKERLOF, George A. “The Market for Lemons: Quality Uncertainty and the
Market Mechanism”, Quarterly Journal of Economics vol. 84, August 1970, pp.
488-500.
[2] ALLEN, Franklin and SANTOMERO, Anthony M., “The theory of ﬁnancial
intermediation”, Journal of Banking & Finance vol. 21, 1998, pp. 1461-1485.
[3] BARRO, Robert J., and SANTOMERO, Anthony M., “Household Money Hold-
ings and The Demand Deposit Rate”, Journal of Money, Credit and Banking
vol. 4, n. 2, May 1972, pp. 397-413.
[4] BERGER, Allen N. and UDELL, Gregory F., “Some Evidence on the Empirical
Signiﬁcance of Credit Rationing”, Journal of Political Economy, vol. 100, 1992,
pp. 1047-1077.
[5] BERGER, Allen N. and UDELL, Gregory F., “Small Business Credit Availabil-
ity and Relationship Lending: the Importance of Bank Organisational Struc-
ture”, T h eE c o n o m i cJ o u r n a l , vol. 112, February 2002, pp. 32-53.
[6] BERLIN, Mitchell and MESTER, Loretta, ”On the proﬁtability and cost of
relationship lending”, Journal of Banking & Finance 22, 1998, pp. 873-879.
[7] BERLIN, Mitchell and MESTER, Loretta, ”Deposits and Relationship Lend-
ing”, The Review of Financial Studies vol. 12, n. 3, 1999, pp. 579-607.
[8] BOOT, Arnoud W. A., GREENBAUM, Stuart I., and THAKOR, Anjan V.,
“Reputation and Discretion in Financial Contracting”, The American Economic
Review vol. 83 NO 5, December 1993, pp. 1165-1183.
[9] BORN, Karl Erich, International Banking in the 19th and 20th Centuries, Berg
Publisher Ltd., Stuttgart, 1983.
[10] BRUNNER, Karl, “A Schema for the Supply of Money”, International Eco-
nomic Review, vol. 2, N. 1, January 1961, pp. 79-107.
[11] CHAN, Yuk-Shee and KANATAS, George, “Asymmetric Valuations and the
Role of Collateral in Loan Agreements”, Journal of Money, Credit and Banking
vol. 17, February 1985, pp. 84-95.
[12] COLE, Rebel A. “The importance of relationship to the availability of credit”,
Journal of Banking & Finance vol. 22, 1998, pp. 959-977.
[13] COSIMANO, Thomas, “The Federal Funds Market under Bank Deregulation”,
Journal Money, Credit and Banking Vol. 19, No. 3, August 1987, pp. 326-339.
[14] COSIMANO, Thomas, “The Banking Industry Under Uncertain Monetary Pol-
icy”, Journal of Banking and Finance 12, March 1988, pp. 117-139. Journal of
Monetary Economics 41, 1988, pp. 57-70.
26[15] COSIMANO, Thomas, and McDONALD, Bill, “What’s diﬀerent among
banks?”, Journal of Monetary Economics 41, 1998, pp. 57-70.
[16] COSIMANO, Thomas, VAN HUICK, John B., “Dynamic Monetary Control
and Interest Rate Stabilization”, Journal of Monetary Economics 23, 1989, pp.
53-63.
[17] DIAMOND, Douglas W., “Financial Intermediation and Delegated Monitor-
ing”, Review of Economic Studies 51, 1984, pp. 393-414.
[18] DIAMOND, Douglas W., “Monitoring and Reputation: The Choice between
Bank Loans and Directly Placed Debt”, Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 99,
no. 4, 1991, pp. 689-721.
[19] DIAMOND, Douglas W. and RAJAN, Raghuram, “Liquidity risk, liquidity
creation and ﬁnancial fragility: a theory of banking”, NBER Working Paper n.
743, December 1999.
[20] DIAMOND, Douglas W. and RAJAN, Raghuram, “Banks and Liquidity”, The
American Economic Review Papers and Proceedings, VOL. 91 No. 2, May 2001,
pp. 422-425.
[21] ELSASYANI, Elyas, KOPECKY, Kenneth J. and VAN HOOSE David, “Cost
of Adjustment, Portfolio Separation, and the Dynamic Behaviour of Bank Loans
and Deposits”, Journal of Money, Credit and Banking vol. 27, November 1995,
Part I, pp. 955-974.
[22] FAMA, Eugene, “What’s Diﬀerent About Banks?”, Journal of Monetary Eco-
nomics vol. 15, January 1985, pp. 39-57.
[23] FAMA, Eugene (1985), “Banking in the Theory of Finance””,Journal of Mon-
etary Economics vol. 6, January 1980, pp. 39-57.
[24] FAMA, Eugene (1985),“Financial Intermediation and Price Level Con-
trol”,Journal of Monetary Economics vol. 12, 1983, pp. 7-28.
[25] FLANNERY, Mark J., “Retail Bank Deposits as Quasi Fixed Factors of Pro-
duction”, The American Economic Review vol. 57, 1982, pp. 527-535.
[26] FLANNERY, Mark J. (1994),“Debt Maturity and the Deadweight Cost of
Leverage: Optimally Financing Banking Firms”, The American Economic Re-
view vol. 84 NO 1, 1994, pp. 320-331.
[27] FRIED, Joel and HOWITT, Peter, “Credit Rationing and Implicit Contract
Theory”, Journal of Money, Credit and Banking 12, August 1980, pp. 471-487.
[28] GALE, Douglas and HELLWIG, Martin, “Incentive-Compatible Debt Con-
tracts: the One-Period Problem”, Review of Economic Studies, No. 52, pp.
647-663.
27[29] GOODHART, Charles A. E. (1985), The Evolution of central Banks,The MIT
Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts and London.
[30] GORTON, Gary B., and PENNACCHI, George G., “Banks and Loan Sales:
Marketing Nonmarketable Assets”,Journal of Monetary Economics vol. 35,
1995, pp. 389-411.
[31] HANNAN, Timothy H. and BERGER, Allen N., “The Rigidity of Prices: Ev-
idence from the Banking Industry”,The American Economic Review vol. 81,
1991, pp. 938-945.
[32] HART, Oliver D. and JAFFEE, Dwight M., “On the Application of Portfolio
Theory to Depository Financial Intermediaries”, Review of Economic Studies,
April 1973, pp. 129-147.
[33] HART, Oliver D. and MOORE, J., “Incomplete Contracts and Regonetiations”,
Econometrica, Vol. 56, n. 4, pp. 755-785.
[34] HAYEK, Friedrich A. von, Individualism and Economic Order, London, Rout-
ledge and Kegan Paul,1945.
[35] HAYEK, Friedrich A. von, The Constitution of Liberty, London, Routledge and
Kegan Paul, 1960.
[36] HAYEK, Friedrich A. von, The Fatal Conceit: The Errors of Socialism,i nThe
Collected Works, vol. 1, edited by W.W. Bartley, London, Routledge, 1988.
[37] HESS, Alan C. “The Eﬀects of Transaction Costs on Households’ Financial
Asset Demand”, Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Vol. 23, 1991, pp.
383-409.
[38] HESS, Alan C. “Portfolio Theory, Transaction Costs, and the Demand for Time
Deposits”, Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Vol. 27, 1995, pp. 1015-1032.
[39] HUTCHINSON, David E., “Retail bank deposits Pricing: An Intertemporal
Asset Pricing Approach”, Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, vol. 27, n. 1,
February 1995, pp. 217-231.
[40] JAFFE, Dwight and RUSSELL, Thomas, “Imperfect Information, Uncertainty
and Credit Rationing”, Quarterly Journal of Economics, Nov. 1976, No. 90, pp.
651-666.
[41] KASHYAP, Anil K., RAJAN, Raghuram and STEIN, Jeremy C. “Banks as Liq-
uidity Providers: An Explanation for the Co-Existence of Lending and Deposit
Taking” The Journal of Finance, vol. LVII, No. 1, February 2002, pp. 33-73.
[42] KLEIN, Benjamin, “Competitive Interest Rates Payments on Bank Deposits
and the Long-Run Demand for Money”, The American Economic Review,v o l .
64, n. 6, December 1971, pp. 931-949.
28[43] KLEIN, Benjamin, and LEFFLER, Keith B.,“The Role of Market Forces In
Assuring Contractual Performance”, Journal of Political Economy, vol. 89, No.
41, 1980, pp. 615-640.
[44] KLEIN, Michael, (1971), ”A theory of the banking ﬁrm”, Journal of Money,
Credit and Banking n. 3, March 1971, pp. 205-218.
[45] KNIGHT, Frank H., Risk, Uncertainty, and Proﬁt. Boston, MA: Hart, Schaﬀner
& Marx; Houghton Miﬄin Company, 1921.
[46] LAVOIE, MARC, “The credit led supply of deposits and the demand for money:
Kaldor’s reﬂux mechanism as prevoiusly endorsed by Joan Robinson”, Cam-
bridge Journal of Economics, n. 23, 1999, p. 103-113.
[47] LELAND, H. E., and PYLE, D. H., “Information Asymmetries, Financial
Structure and Financial Intermediaries”, Journal of Finance, Vol. 32, N0. 2,
1977, pp. 371-387.
[48] MERTON, Robert C., “On the Pricing of Corporate Debt: The Risk Structure
of Interest Rates”, The Journal of Finance, vol. 29, May 1974, pp. 449-470.
[49] MYERS, Stewart, and RAJAN, Raghuram “The Paradox of Liquidity”, Quar-
terly Journal of Economics, August 1998, No. 112, pp. 733-771.
[50] MOOSA, Suleman A., “Dynamic Portfolio Balance Behaviour of Time Deposits
and ‘Money”’, The Journal of Finance vol. XXXII, NO. 3, June 1977, pp. 709-
717.
[51] NEUMARK, David and SHARPE, Stephen A., “Market structure and the na-
ture of price rigidity: Evidence from the market of consumer deposits”, Quar-
terly Journal of Economics vol. 107, 1992, pp. 657-680.
[52] NIINIM¨ AKI, J. P., “Intertemporal Diversiﬁcation in Financial Intermediation”,
Journal of Banking & Finance vol. 225, 2001, pp. 965-991.
[53] PETERSEN, Mitchell A. and RAJAN, Raghurham J., “The Beneﬁts of Lending
Relationships: Evidence from Small Business Data”,The Journal of Finance
vol. XLIX no.1, March 1994, pp. 3-37.
[54] RAJAN, Raghuram G., “Insiders and Outsiders: The Choice between Informed
and Arm’s-Length Debt”, The Journal of Finance, vol. XLVII, No. 4, September
1992, pp. 1367-1400.
[55] RAJAN, Raghuram G., “The Past and the Future of Commercial Banking
Viewed through an Incomplete Contract Lenses”, Journal Money, Credit and
Banking Vol. 30, No. 3, August 1998, pp. 524-550.
[56] ROGERS, Kevin, “Product Mix, Bank Powers, and Complementarities at U.
S. Commercial Banks”, Journal of Economics and Business, vol. 50, 1998, pp.
205-218.
29[57] SALOP, Steven, “Information and Monopolistic Competition”, The American
Economic Review, vol. 66, no. 2, May 1976, pp. 240-245.
[58] SALOP, Steven and STIGLITZ, Joseph, “Bargains and Rip-oﬀs: A Model of
Monopolistically Competitive Price Dispersion”, The Review of Economic Stud-
ies, vol. 44, no. 3, October 1977, pp. 493-510.
[59] SALOP, Steven and STIGLITZ, Joseph, “The Theory of Sales: A Simple Model
of Price Dispersion with Identical Agents”, The American Economic Review,
vol. 72, no. 5, December 1982, pp. 1121-1130.
[60] SANTOMERO, Anthony M., and SIEGEL, Jeremy J., Thomas, “Bank Reg-
ulation and Macro-Economic Stability”, The American Economic Review vol.
71, No. 1, March 1981, pp. 39-53.
[61] SANTOMERO, Anthony M., and SIEGEL, Jeremy J., Thomas, “Impact
of Regulation on Money Market Institutions”, The Journal of Finance vol.
XXXVII, No. 2, May 1921, pp. 357-369.
[62] SCHOLTENS, Bert, and VAN WENSWEEN, Dick, “A critique on the theory
of ﬁnancial intermediation”, Journal of Banking & Finance vol. 24, 2000, pp.
1243-1251.
[63] SCHUMPETER, JOSEPH A., The Theory of Economic Development: An In-
quiry into Proﬁts, Capital, Credit, Interest, and the Business Cycles (translated
by Redvers Opie, with a special preface by the author). Cambridge Mass: Har-
vard University Press, 1934. Second Printing 1936; Third Printing 1949. Origi-
nally published in German in 1912 as Theorie der wirtschaftlichen Entwicklung.
[64] SCHUMPETER, JOSEPH A., Business Cycles: A Theoretical, Historical and
Statistical Analysis of the Capitalist Process, New York and London: McGraw-
Hill Book Co., Inc., 1939. Revised edition published in 1964.
[65] LINDLEY, James T., and SEALEY, C. W. Jr., and “Inputs, Outputs and
a Theory of Production and Cost at Depository Financial Institutions”, The
Journal of Finance, Vol. XXXII, No. 4, September 1977, pp. 1251-1266.
[66] SHARPE, Steven A., “Asymmetric Information, Bank Lending, and Implicit
Contracts: A Stylized Model Of Customer Relationships”, The Journal of Fi-
nance, vol. XLV, No. 4, September 1990, pp. 1069-1087.
[67] SPRENKLE, Case M., “The Uselessness of Transaction Demand Models”, The
Journal of Finance, December 1969, pp. 835-848.
[68] SPRENKLE, Case M., “On the Observed Transaction Demand for Money”,
The Manchester School, 1972, pp. 261-267.
[69] STIGLITZ, Joseph and WEISS, Andrew, “Credit Rationing in Markets with
Imperfect Competition” American Economic Review 71, June 1981, pp. 393-
410.
30[70] STIGLITZ, Joseph and WEISS, Andrew, “Asymmetric Information in Credit
Markets and Its Implications for Macroeconomics” Oxford Economic Papers 44,
1992, pp. 694-724.
[71] SZEG¨ O, Giorgio PP., Portfolio Theory With Application to Bank Asset Man-
agement, Academic Press, London, 1980.
[72] THISTLE, Paul D., McLEOD, Robert W. And CONRAD, B. Lynne, “Interest
rates and bank portfolio adjustments”, Journal of Banking & Finance vol. 13,
1989, pp. 151-161.
[73] VALE, Bent, “The Dual Role of Demand Deposits under Asymmetric Informa-
tion”, Scandinavian Journal of Economics vol. 95. (1), 1993, pp. 77-95.
[74] WHEELOCK, David C. and WILSON, Paul W., “New evidence on returns
to scale and product mix among US commercial banks”, Journal of Monetary
Economics, vol. 47, 2001, pp. 653-674.
31